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Can the arts and humanities contribute significantly to the study of the brain? Similar brain processes are
involved in humanistic and scientific inference, and in this essay, I argue that conclusions reached by one
are relevant to the other.Can the arts and humanities contribute
significantly to brain studies? Do they
frame questions regarding human experi-
ence that can be tested experimentally
and are these fundamentally different
from those posed by neuroscience? Is
there any present need or imperative to
appropriate questions from them in
neurobiological studies, or should that
be deferred until more is known about
the functions and functioning of the brain?
These questions impose themselves
forcefully at a time when a significant pro-
portion of human brain studies are ad-
dressing questions that are of importance
to human experience.
Common Questions
Science and the humanities have much to
separate them but much to unite them
too. Artistic and scientific questions are
commonly the same, though addressed
differently, and hence, the former provide
hints and guesses for scientific experi-
mentation. I have written of artists and
humanists as being, in a sense, neurobiol-
ogists who explore the brain, though with
techniques that are unique to them (Zeki,
1993). Paul Ce´zanne’s preoccupation,
and artistic experimentation, with how
color modulates form is but a variant of
the neurobiological question of how the
separate representations of form and
color are integrated in the brain to give
us a unitary percept of both (Zeki, 1978;
Livingstone and Hubel, 1988). The exper-
iments of Picasso and Braque in the early,
analytic, phase of cubism—of how a
form maintains its identity in spite of
wide variations in the context in which it
is viewed—resolves itself scientifically
into the neurobiological problem of form
constancy. The quest of Piet Mondrian
for the ‘‘constant truths concerning12 Neuron 84, October 1, 2014 ª2014 The Auforms’’ (Mondrian, 1941) is an artistic
version of the question of what the neural
building blocks of all forms are (often pre-
sumed to be the orientation-selective
cells of the visual cortex), while kinetic
art, which sought to represent motion
artistically, reached conclusions that are
consistent with conclusions reached later
by neurobiology (Zeki and Lamb, 1994).
All Truths Are Subjective
These are, in a sense, facile rallying points
that merely serve to emphasize different
approaches to what are, at heart, com-
mon questions. More difficult to address
are shared questions regarding human
experience and what they signify about
brain operations and the world in which
it has developed. Here the boundary
between neurobiological and humanistic
questions is faint and separating the
two, I believe, does both a disservice
even if, at present, the relationship be-
tween neuroesthetics and the humanities
is asymmetric, in that neuroesthetics
has a good deal more to gain from the
humanities than the latter from us. Many
of the critical questions now addressed
experimentally by neuroesthetics have
been addressed in philosophical dis-
course for centuries. Prominent among
these is the problem of knowledge, a pri-
mordial function of the brain and a central
issue in philosophy. Using color vision as
an example, Arthur Schopenhauer argued
that ‘‘a more precise knowledge and
firmer conviction of the wholly subjective
nature of color contributes to a more pro-
found comprehension of the Kantian doc-
trine of the likewise subjective, intellectual
forms of all knowledge’’ (Schopenhauer,
1854), since color is a subjective experi-
ence that is the result of a transformation
of the objective reality of the outside worldthorby rules that govern the operations of the
mind (brain). The only knowledge we can
therefore have of color is ‘‘brain knowl-
edge’’. The brain, far from representing
colors (or indeed the sensory world)
passively and veridically, constructs
them through inherited programs (algo-
rithms) (Zeki, 1993). Neurobiology has
yet to unravel the details of these opera-
tions, but their purpose is to stabilize the
colors of surfaces in spite of continual
fluctuations in the wavelength-energy
composition of the light reflected from
them, leading to a constancy of colors.
While we can be (subjectively) sure that
a leaf is green even when it reflects more
long-wave (red) light (as is common at
sunset or sunrise), we can never be sure,
unless armed with light-measuring de-
vices, of the ‘‘objective’’ reality in terms
of the precise wavelength-energy com-
position of the light reflected from a sur-
face and from its surrounds. Generally
speaking, the only truths that we can be
certain of are those that we experience,
namely subjective truths. This is but one
example of a shared general question in
neurobiology and the humanities—of
how objects and situations maintain their
identity in spite of continual changes in
the signals reaching the brain from them,
summarized for Western philosophy in
the Heraclitan doctrine of flux and for
Eastern (Buddhist) philosophy in the
statement that ‘‘nothing is permanent
except change.’’
Similar Inferential Processes in
Scientific and Humanistic
Approaches
The primacy of subjective truths extends
from an apparently elementary process
such as color to much more complex
experiences, such as those of beauty,
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cepts such as the experience of mathe-
matical beauty. The path to acquiring
knowledge—whether grounded in scien-
tific experimentation or through philo-
sophical (Cellucci, 2013) or humanistic
speculation—must use similar mental
processes. There is no reason to suppose
that thebrainprocesses leading to subjec-
tive truths—in terms of inference, which is
the result of observation and of inductive,
deductive, and analogic reasoning—are
different for the sciences and the human-
ities. Indeed, the similarity may extend to
metaphoric and metonymic reasoning.
The humanistic approach—be it in art
or philosophy—is equally grounded in
experimentation, of a different, more
speculative kind but one that is neverthe-
less also subject to the logic of the brain.
Its results, significantly, lend themselves
to scientific experimentation. Hence, in
seeking to understand human nature
and the human condition, conclusions
reached by humanistic debate and dis-
cussion are no less or more valid than
those reached by scientific experimenta-
tion, even if translation from humanistic
achievements to scientific experimenta-
tion is neither straightforward nor easy. A
major difference is that, to attain scientific
status as valid for populations instead
of individuals, subjective truths require
scientific validation, usually through sta-
tistical inference. Indeed, given their
longevity and the similarity in brain pro-
cesses leading to inferences in both the
sciences and humanities, subjective
truths revealed by humanistic discourse
can in fact be said to have also been sub-
ject to scientific experimentation and sta-
tistical validation and hence provide rich
material for scientific experimentation.
The works of Plato, Sophocles, Kant,
Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, and Balzac,
among others, have a longevity even sur-
passing those of scientific works because
they reveal subjective truths that are
generally applicable to all humans. One
is likely to acquire asmuch experimentally
testable knowledge, for example, from
reading Kant on aesthetics or Balzac and
Zola on creativity than one would from
any presently available scientific text.
The Experience of Beauty
Perhaps nowhere is the interdependence
of humanistic enquiry and experimentalinvestigation more intertwined than in
the study of one of the most ubiquitous
of (subjective) human experiences—that
of beauty; it serves as a powerful ground,
as well as an example, for uniting
the humanistic and neurobiological ap-
proaches. Neuroesthetics does not
enquire into what beauty is and does
not (contrary to common belief) confound
it with art. It also acknowledges the
importance of culture and learning in
shaping aesthetic experience. But its pri-
mary concern at present is to understand
the neural mechanisms that allow all
humans, regardless of race or culture, to
experience beauty. Since an aesthetic
experience implies having made a judg-
ment, it also aims to unravel the neural
systems underlying aesthetic judgments
and address the question, first posed by
Kant, of whether aesthetic judgments
precede or succeed aesthetic experi-
ences. In short, like the art critic Clive
Bell, neuroesthetics seeks to understand
what, in aesthetic experience, is ‘‘com-
mon to all and peculiar to none’’ (Bell,
1914), which is not to deny that, superim-
posed upon the commonality, there are
subjective differences in experiences
that science must account for.
It was, after all, a philosopher, Edmund
Burke, who defined beauty in significantly
neurobiological terms, as being ‘‘largely
a property of objects acting upon the
human mind through the intervention of
the senses’’ (Burke, 1757, my emphasis).
Today, much of the inspiration for the
paradigms used to study the neurobi-
ology of aesthetic experience, whether
acknowledged or not, comes from philo-
sophical studies.
Though Bell thought of aesthetic expe-
rience as a ‘‘purely subjective business,’’
he, like others before and after him,
sought for ‘‘objective’’ characteristics
that constitute an essential ingredient of
beauty. Whether such a characteristic
exists has been debated but without a
consensus. This is not surprising. Sym-
metry, for example, is not considered to
be characteristic of beauty in all cultures;
it does not therefore qualify as a charac-
teristic that is ‘‘common to all and pecu-
liar to none.’’ Characteristics such as
proportion or size, though of importance
in domains such as architecture, are
meaningless when applied to the aes-
thetics of, for example, color. As well,Neuronthere is the functional specialization in
the brain and in vision, for example,
different areas of the (visual) brain are
specialized to process different attributes
such as color, motion, and form (Zeki,
1978; Zeki et al., 1991). This suggests
that, in the visual domain, there may be
many different visual characteristics
(which I have termed ‘‘significant configu-
rations’’; Zeki, 2013), belonging to dif-
ferent visual domains, each one capable
of activating the relevant visual area in
a manner that arouses the ‘‘aesthetic
emotion’’ in that domain, as appears to
be the case for kinetic stimuli (Zeki and
Stutters, 2012). But there is a common
characteristic that is independent of
learning, culture, and ethnic origin to all
that is experienced as beautiful, one
that is ‘‘common to all and peculiar to
none.’’ It lies in a simple neurobiological
fact—that whenever an individual experi-
ences beauty, regardless of whether the
source is visual, musical, moral, or math-
ematical, there is a correlate in the form
of activity in a part of the emotional brain,
namely field A1 of medial orbitofrontal
cortex (A1 mOFC) (Ishizu and Zeki,
2011). Interestingly, this area is also
active when subjects have pleasant or
rewarding experiences—both of which
have been strongly linked to beauty in
the philosophy of aesthetics (Gordon,
1997), providing a good area for future
experimentation designed to reveal the
relationship, in neural terms, between
these subjective experiences. This raises
the question of what role the sensory
areas of the brain play in translating
significant visual configurations into
an aesthetic emotion, a neurobiological
problem of importance that extends well
beyond neuroesthetics. Whether stimuli
such as faces, for example, are perceived
as ugly or beautiful, they activate com-
mon areas critical for the perception of
faces (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Haxby
et al., 2000). But faces that are perceived
as beautiful correlate as well with activity
in mOFC (O’Doherty et al., 2003), while
those experienced as fearful correlate
with activity in amygdala (Morris et al.,
1996). Some feature of these stimuli
must activate the common areas differ-
entially, leading to different outputs from
them. Neurobiologically, the question
resolves itself into the broader one of
the pattern of activity within a common84, October 1, 2014 ª2014 The Author 13
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from it to one destination or another.
The Larger Significance of Beauty
If all truths, whether sensory, aesthetic,
or derived from higher cognitive and intel-
lectual sources such as mathematics are
subjective, it becomes interesting to ask
whether the (subjective) experience of
beauty in general is a pointer to universal
truths about ourselves and the Universe
in which we have evolved, just as sensory
experiences such as those of color are
pointers to truths about ourselves and
the ever fluctuating world in which we
have evolved. The experience of color,
derived from a sensory source, reveals
a truth about how our brain obtains
knowledge by stabilizing the continually
changing world in which it has evolved
sensorially. That the experience of mathe-
matical beauty, just like the experience
of musical and visual beauty, correlates
with activity in field A1 of mOFC not only
shows the abstract nature of beauty
but also raises the question of whether
beauty, regardless of its source, is also a
pointer to deeper truths, a sort of yard-
stick for determining the truthfulness of
what that experience reveals. Put simply,
to what extent is the structured order,
or the ordered structure, of the Universe
in which we have evolved reflected in
the organization of our brains and to
what extent is the experience of beauty
a pointer to that structure? Beauty, which
lies at the heart of these questions, is a
topic that has traditionally been more
speculated on in humanistic debate,
though one that is becoming of increasing
interest to science and especially neuro-
biology. A neurobiological quest for what
enables us to experience beauty and
what that experience signifies is vastly
impoverished without significant reliance
on speculations in the humanities.
The Many Uses of Beauty
In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin
made sexual selection the centerpiece
of his views on beauty and there seems
little doubt that, for example, plumage
on male birds, often perceived as beauti-
ful by humans, reveals a (subjective) truth
in the females about desirable male char-
acteristics in that species, making the
bearer a suitable mate for reproductive
selection. But, as Rothenberg (2011) has14 Neuron 84, October 1, 2014 ª2014 The Auemphasized, this raises the question of
why a particular combination of colors
is chosen, and why particular structural
patterns are used by, for example, bow-
birds to create their bowers to attract
females. Basing beauty on sexual selec-
tion alone also leaves out of account other
examples of beauty such as camouflage,
which have functions the opposite of
attracting sexual attention (Rothenberg,
2011). Hence, an enquiry into why partic-
ular patterns or colors are chosen to act
as sexual attractors also constitutes an
enquiry into whether what is experienced
as beautiful is related as well to what
coincides with patterns in our brain, which
has evolved to construct a picture of the
external world.
That fundamental laws governing the
structure of our Universe can be ex-
pressed in mathematical formulations
that arouse the ‘‘aesthetic emotion’’ has
long been emphasized by mathemati-
cians, who in general place a high pre-
mium on beauty. Plato and the Platonic
tradition suppose that mathematical for-
mulations are experienced as beautiful
because they give insights into the funda-
mental structure of the Universe and
hence its beauty. Kant went beyond and
supposed that such formulations arouse
the aesthetic emotion because of the
feeling that ‘‘they make sense’’ (Breiten-
bach, 2013). What ‘‘makes sense’’ is of
course what corresponds to the workings
and above all the logic of the brain. Hence
the aesthetic emotion, even in the ‘‘queen
of sciences,’’ may be a pointer as much
toward truths about both the Universe as
about the workings of the brain. It leads
one to enquire, for example, whether
humans would have developed string
theory, for which there is little if any exper-
imental evidence, if we did not possess
the kind of brain organization that we
have. It is a fascinating question.
In summary, oncewe acknowledge that
all knowledge is mediated through the
operations of the brain and its cognitive
apparatus, and is therefore subjective,
and that similar brain processes are
involved in humanistic and scientific
inference, we are led ineluctably to the
view that conclusions reached by one
are relevant to those reached by the other
and that the humanities provide a rich
source of hints about the operations of
the brain, which neurobiology and morethorparticularly neuroesthetics should be
ready to exploit and is doing so.
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